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The purpose of this research is to explore how an international 
framework could be developed in order to safeguard large dams against 
sabotage by nonstate actors, such as terrorist organizations or hostile 
civilians.  The necessity of an international security agreement to manage 
dams as a global security threat will be clearly substantiated via an 
analysis of three determinants: the possible magnitude of dam failure, the 
inadequacies of international law to regulate asymmetric warfare, and 
the evolving threat of dam sabotage in the developing world.  
Subsequently, various legal components and regulatory mechanisms 
from an existing international agreement will be considered with regard 
to their adaption in a hypothetical security resolution.  Specifically, I will 
argue that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 serves 
as an exemplary model for an international security agreement to 
safeguard potentially dangerous dams from sabotage.  This assertion will 
be conveyed through a detailed analysis of the resolution’s background, 
design, binding nature, role in existing legal regime, political buy-in, 
state-level implementation, and compliance scheme.  Furthermore, 
certain limitations and criticisms of this argument will be intermittently 
addressed as they pertain to the aforementioned elements and theoretical 
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Introduction: The Necessity of an International Security 
Agreement  
 
Magnitude of Dam Failure 
 
Dam failure should be viewed as a global security risk on account 
of the tremendous energy and water stored behind these structures.  In 
the event of dam failure, rapid and unforeseeable flooding can occur 
downstream, resulting in a significant loss of human life, 
environmental destruction, and long-lasting economic disruption.1  In 
the summer of 1975, a historic amount of rain fell upon the Henan 
province in China.  The unprecedented rainfall happened to occur after 
the Chinese government engaged in years of rapid dam development 
during the social and economic campaign known as Great Leap 
Forward.  The storm caused such intense flooding that the Banqiao 
Reservoir Dam, located in the Henan province, eventually collapsed.2  
It is estimated that the crumbling of this dam created a moving wall of 
water that was nearly 6 meters tall and 12 kilometer long.3 This dam 
failure ultimately killed over 170,000 people.4  In comparison, the 
United States Department of Energy estimates that the causalities 
suffered from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was around 100,000 
by the end of 1945.5  Therefore, one can easily deduce that dam failure 
is a high level security risk where the magnitude of devastation rivals 
commonly defined weapons of mass destruction.  For this reason, 
military powers have historically targeted dams as a means to destroy 
large population centers during times of armed conflict.6  
 
 
 1. The Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, Hazard Mitigation Plan Section 14: Dam 
Failure 1, 1-2, http://www.gbra.org/documents/hazardmitigation/update/section14-damfail 
ure.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 2. Eric Fish, The Forgotten Legacy of the Banqiao Dam Collapse, INTERNATIONAL 
RIVERS (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-forgotten-legacy-
of-the-banqiao-dam-collapse-7821. 
 3. Yi Si, The World’s Most Catastrophic Dam Failures: The August 1975 Collapse of 
the Banqiao and Shimantan Dams in THE RIVER DRAGON HAS COME! 25, 26 (M.E. Sharpe, 
Ming Yo trans., 1998). 
 4. Eric Fish, supra note 2. 
 5. U.S. Dept. of Energy, The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, https://www.osti.gov/ 
opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945/hiroshima.htm. 
 6. Marcus DuBois King, The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq, VOL. 40 WASH. 
QUART. Rev. 53, 15556 (2016). 
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Inadequacies of International Law  
 
Since the Banqiao Dam catastrophe, dams have been defined in 
Article 56 of Protocol I amendment protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions as “installations containing dangerous forces.”7  Article 
56 of Protocol I pertains to the protection of works and installations 
containing dangerous forces in international armed conflicts.  It states 
that dams “shall not be made the object of attack, even where these 
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of 
dangerous forces and consequence severe losses among the civilian 
population.”8  This prohibition is similarly stated in Article 15 of 
Protocol II, which regulates noninternational armed conflicts.9  An 
appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1997 urged 
nations who had not yet ratified the Additional Protocols to quickly do 
so given their universal scope as customary international law, 
regardless of whether a state actually ratified the instruments.10  These 
Additional Protocols are complemented by the 1976 Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques.  The convention states that contracting 
parties may not engage in “any hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another state 
party.”11   
Yet, the legitimacy of Article 56 of Protocol I as customary 
humanitarian international law is directly challenged by the world’s 
most capable militaries.  For instance, the United States have since 
refused to ratify Protocol I, which critics argue has hindered the 
widespread application of these international laws and norms.12  
American opposition to Protocol I is perhaps unsurprising when 
 
 7. International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=opendocum 
ent &documentId=3376730ECD9DF7B1C12563CD0051DD37 (last visited Sept. 29, 2017). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Cornelio Sommaruga, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 320 (Oct. 31, 
1997). https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnux.htm. 
 11. International Committee of the Red Cross, Convention on the Prohibition of Military 
or any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, https://ihl-data 
bases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/460 (Dec. 10, 1979). 
 12. Jason Gehrig & Mark M. Rogers, Water and Conflict: Incorporating Peacebuilding 
into Water Development 5153 (Catholic Relief Services, 2009), https://www.crs.org 
/sites/default/files/tools-research/water-and-conflict.pdf.  
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considering that the United States has historically targeted dams 
and other forms of infrastructure during the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars.13  While one might rush to define such action as a flagrant 
disregard for international law, these military tactics were 
undertaken before Protocol I came into existence.14  It should also 
be taken into account that world powers who often engage in 
international armed conflicts have more of an incentive to reject 
codified limitations on their abilities given the increasingly 
complex nature of war.  For example, the United States concluded 
that Protocol I should not be ratified due to specific concerns about 
it limiting the abilities of the U.S. military to combat terrorism, and 
not because it objected to the overarching components of the 
protocol.15  Regardless, according to Jason Gehrig and Mark M. 
Rogers in Water and Conflict, Protocol I still carries “considerable 
moral weight during war, and serves as a means for demanding 
more humane behavior in times of armed conflict between states.”16   
The moral weight of this protocol as international law may be 
supported through an investigation of the controversy surrounding 
Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam.  The construction of this dam, 
the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, has sparked tension 
between Ethiopia and Egypt.17  The main points of contention 
surrounding this hydroelectric dam are Egyptian concerns that the 
structure will reduce their historically large portion of the Nile’s 
flow and cause damage to the Egyptian economy.18  A number of 
Egyptian politicians have even called for covert military action to 
sabotage the dam.  Despite failed efforts by basin countries to 
include Egypt in joint management of the Nile, as prescribed by 
 
 13. WARD THOMAS, THE ETHICS OF DESTRUCTION: NORMS AND FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 15253 (Cornell University Press, 1st ed. 2001). 
 14. Id. 
 15. The White House, A Message from the President of the United States regarding Protocol 
II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, Jan. 29, 1987, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-
study/united-states-president-rejects-protocol-i. 
 16. Jason Gehrig & Mark M. Rogers, supra note 11, at 53. 
 17. Patrick Kingsley, Nile Dam Study Fails to Stem the Tide of Egyptian Indignation 
Towards Ethiopia, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 16, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/poverty-matters/2014/apr/16/nile-dam-study-egyptian-indignation-ethiopia. 
 18. Scott McKenzie, International Water Law – Preventing Conflict on the Nile, OPINIO 
JURIS, July 16, 2013, http://opiniojuris.org/2013/07/16/emerging-voices-international-water-
law-preventing-conflict-on-the-nile/. 
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Article 24 of the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention,19 no 
sabotage attempts have been made to date.20  While the absence of 
military action or clandestine sabotage is likely due to a number of 
factors, this conflict nonetheless represents state adherence to 
international humanitarian law and specifically to Article 56 of 
Protocol I.   
Although adherence to international humanitarian law has been 
widely observed by nation states, non-state actors such as ISIS, Boko 
Haram, and Al-Qaida blatantly disregard the law of armed conflict and 
international humanitarian law by committing mass executions and 
widespread attacks on civilians.21  The United Nations Security 
Council has increasingly called upon armed nonstate actors to begin 
respecting international law, but this has not translated into a 
significant change in behavior.22  In fact, many argue that the Geneva 
Conventions and other sources of the law of armed conflict and 
international humanitarian law do not properly manage asymmetric 
conflict involving states and nonstate actors of varying capabilities 
and objectives.23  This concept is furthered by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, who have explicitly acknowledged that 
international humanitarian law only regulates armed conflict between 
“parties.” Parties include states, national liberation movements, or 
other armed groups that have a certain organized structure.24  The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone has reaffirmed this distinction in 2004, 
when it held that nonstate actors must abide by international 
humanitarian law if the group is organized and fighting has reached a 
certain level of intensity.25  Still, much of the violence now 
 
 19. G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (May 21, 1997). 
 20. Patrick Kingsley, supra note 16. 
 21. Lyal S. Sunga, Can International law Meet the Challenges of Today’s Lawless 
Conflicts, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop  
ment -professionals-network/2015/nov/14/international-law-yemen-syria-isis-conflict. 
 22. STUART CASEY-MASLEN, WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
171 (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
 23. Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law 
humanitarian action, VOL. 87, NO. 857 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 158, 160 (March 2005), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_857_pfanner.pdf. 
 24. International Committee of the Red Cross, International humanitarian law and 
terrorism: questions and answers (Jan. 1, 2011) https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/docu 
ments/faq/terrorism-faq-050504.htm#Dosomeaspectsofthefightagainstterrorismamounttoatra 
nsnationalarmedconflict. 
 25. STUART CASEY-MASLEN, supra note 21, at 172. 
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surrounding domestic and international armed conflicts throughout the 
world involve isolated attacks, either by loosely organized groups or 
individuals that may fall outside these definitions.26  In essence, 
international law has proven to be a rather inadequate means of 
ensuring that nonstate actors abide by international norms and 
humanitarian law.  This is largely because modern warfare has 
evolved to a point where the existing international framework does not 
clearly define which emerging entities are subject to international law.  
There is also a clear indication that certain actors may not abide by 
international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict 
regardless of clear and codified obligations under international law.  
  
Evolving Threat of Dam Sabotage in the Developing World   
 
Rapid urbanization, population growth, and environmental 
concerns like climate change have increased demands by 
governments and international agencies for hydroelectric power in 
the developing world.27  As documented by the International 
Energy Agency, there has been a notable resurgence in large dam 
construction within the past few years as developing nations devote 
themselves towards sustainable development.28  This trend may be 
observed in areas such as Central America, where officials have 
increased hydroelectric dam construction because of the U.N.’s 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).29  This mechanism, as defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, enables developing nations to 
construct emission reduction projects, like hydroelectric dams, and 
then sell carbon credits to developed nations with emission 
reduction targets.30  On the other hand, there is a growing consensus 
 
 26. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 23. 
 27. George Ledec & Juan D. Quintero, Good Dams and Bad Dams, Good Dams and Bad 
Dams: Environmental Criteria for Site Selection of Hydroelectric Projects, The World Bank 
Latin America and Caribbean Region Sustainable Development Working Paper 16 
(November 2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LACEXT/Resources/258553-112325 
0606139/Good_and_Bad_Dams_WP16.pdf. 
 28. International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2012, 22026 (2012), 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2012_free.pdf. 
 29. Dr. Kate Brannum, Human Security and the Threat of Hydroelectric Dams, In 
Homeland Security 1, 11 (Apr. 13, 2015) http://inhomelandsecurity.com/human-security-
and-the-threat-of-hydroelectric-dams/. 
 30. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
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that the construction of large dams is not compatible with 
sustainable development due to negative social and environmental 
impacts.31 Regardless of these contrasting perspectives, I argue that 
this trend towards large dam construction is particularly concerning 
because many developing nations have neither the proper legal 
mechanisms nor capabilities to ensure the security of these 
structures. 
For example, in August 2014 an unrecognized state and terrorist 
group, known as ISIS, was able to capture the 3.2-kilometer-long Mosul 
Dam in Iraq.32  One could contend that ISIS would be forbidden from 
attacking the Mosul Dam since the group’s extensive hierarchical 
structure and heightened level of conflict qualifies them as a “party” 
under the Geneva Conventions.  Be that as it may, ISIS appears to take a 
drastically different approach to engaging in armed conflict when 
compared to previously active entities that would also be afforded the 
protections and obligations of “parties” under the Geneva Conventions.33  
Unlike the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) and Basque separatists 
(ETA) who had some regard and adherence to codified international 
customary law, ISIS and similar groups remain opposed to previously 
recognized norms of international humanitarian law.34  This dam 
takeover caused officials in the United States to fear that the Islamic State 
militants might sabotage the structure and release what would easily be 
defined as “dangerous forces” under Protocol I or II of the Geneva 
Conventions.35  American airstrikes were called in to combat this threat 
and a counter attack led by Kurdish and Iraqi forces was successful in 
retaking the dam.36  Without this quickly orchestrated response, the 
projected flood wave from sabotage and destruction of the Mosul 
Dam would have released a nearly 70-foot wall of water onto the 
city of Mosul, and caused extensive flooding in Baghdad hundreds 
 
10, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 Feb. 16, 2005. 
 31. David Biello, The Dam Building Boom: Right Path to Clean Energy? (Feb. 23, 2009), 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_dam_building_boom_right_path_to_clean_energy/2119/. 
 32. Umberto Baachi, Mosul Dam: Italian company signs contract to repair Iraqi dam at 
risk of collapse on ISIS frontline THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, March 3, 2016, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mosul-dam-italian-company-signs-contract-repair-iraqi-dam-risk-
collapse-isis-frontline-1547157. 
 33. Lyal S. Sunga, supra note 20. 
 34. Id. 
 35. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 7. 
 36. Felicia Schwartz, Dion Nissenbaum & Nour Malas, U.S. Airstrikes Aim at Islamic 
State hold on Iraq Dam, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-air 
craft-conducting-strikes-against-militants-at-mosul-dam-1408200303. 
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of miles away.37  Some have estimated that this massive wave could 
kill as many as a million and a half people.38  The regional and 
global ramifications of such an incident would be unprecedented.   
The Mosul Dam incident is not unique in our day and age.  
According to a 2012 report by the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, separatist, communist, and Islamist insurgent 
groups have attempted over 25 attacks on dams between 2001 and 
2011.39  Not surprisingly, the majority of these attacks have taken 
place in the developing world.40  While these attacks were 
successfully thwarted or failed to bring about mass destruction, 
certain nations do not possess the resources or capabilities to ensure 
dam security.  The Mosul Dam takeover demonstrates this 
assessment, as the Iraqi government was clearly incapable of 
ensuring state control over the Mosul Dam from an encroaching 
terrorist organization.41  The global security threat posed by dam 
sabotage will only become more profound as developing nations 
continue to build large hydroelectric dams.  Additionally, countries 
such as the United States cannot be reasonably expected to halt such 
catastrophes on a global level.  The magnitude of destruction that 
comes with dam sabotage is too great to be safeguarded by any one 
nation.   
In light of these considerations, it is evident that an 
international framework is required to effectively prevent non-state 
actors from sabotaging large dams and using them as weapons of 
mass destruction.  Throughout the rest of this paper, I will present 
an argument as to why the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540 serves as an ideal model for such a hypothetical 
security agreement.  This thesis will be conclusively supported 
through a comprehensive examination of the background, design, 
 
 37. The New York Times, Iraq’s Biggest Dam Could Collapse at Any Time, Killing 
Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/world/middle 
east/iraqs-biggest-dam-could-collapse-at-any-time-killing-thousands.html?_r=0. 
 38. Dexter Filkins, A Bigger Problem Than ISIS?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 2, 2017,   
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/02/a-bigger-problem-than-isis. 
 39. Department of Homeland Security, Worldwide Attacks Against Dams 9 (2012), 
http://www.cowarn.org/uploads/news/Worldwide%20Attacks%20against%20Dams%20-%2 
02012.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 1011. 
 41. Jeremy Bender, Isis Has Seized Iraq’s Largest Dam, And What Happens Next is 
Critical, BUS. INSIDER, Aug 7, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-has-seized-the-
mosul-dam-2014-8. 
4. Ian Andrew Barber - UN Resolution 1540 ready for production (1) (1).docx 11/17/2017  12:49 PM 
2018] UN Security Council Resolution 1540: An Exemplary Model 107 
binding nature, role in existing legal regime, political buy-in, 
implementation, and compliance scheme of Resolution 1540.  In 
addition, certain limitations and criticisms, including perceived 
problems of implementation and compliance, will be addressed to 
provide a more extensive understanding of the resolution and its 
role as a model agreement.   
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: An Exemplary 
Model 
 
Background and Design 
 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 was 
unanimously adopted in 2004 by the United Nations Security Council 
with the purpose of preventing nonstate actors from acquiring and 
utilizing weapons of mass destruction.  The weapons of mass 
destruction referred to in this agreement include “nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons and their delivery systems.”42  Delivery means 
are defined under this resolution as “missiles, rockets and other 
unmanned systems capable of delivering” the aforementioned types of 
weapons.43  The U.N. Security Council quickly passed Resolution 
1540 as a reactionary measure to the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear 
proliferation network in 2004, and in light of the September 11 attacks 
in 2001.44  Through the adoption of this resolution, the United Nations 
Security Council created new legal measures to solve a growing 
international security threat.  Whereas previous agreements and 
conventions existed to halt state actors from acquiring and utilizing 
weapons of mass destruction, no comprehensive resolution had 
been adopted with regard to non-state actors, like terrorist 
organizations.45  Neither unconventional weapons of mass 
destruction nor their means of delivery were expressly included in 
the resolution. 
The overall design of Resolution 1540 lends support to the idea 
 
 42. S.C. Res. 1540 (April 28, 2004). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Igor Khripunov, A Work in Progress: UN Security Resolution 1540 After 10 Years, 
44 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, no. 4 (2014), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/A-Work-
in-Progress-UN-Security-Resolution-1540-After-10-Years. 
 45. Department of Homeland Security, supra note 39. 
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that this resolution is exemplary in nature and thus a proper model 
for emulation in other collective security agreements.  As 
previously distinguished, one can see that the framers of this 
resolution recognized a particular threat to world peace, and went 
about crafting an international agreement aimed at neutralizing this 
global security hazard.  The agreement design of Resolution 1540 
is narrowly focused in a way that it tackles a specific problem  the 
proliferation and utilization of weapons of mass destruction by 
nonstate actors.46  The specificity of Resolution 1540 is a key 
element of its success, as international agreements that are 
constructed to be overly broad may not have a significant impact 
nor bring about a change in state behavior.  For instance, the narrow 
focus of the Montreal Protocol has been deemed as an essential 
component to its success.47  By focusing exclusively on eliminating 
certain substances that depleted the ozone layer, the protocol was 
successful in phasing out CFCs.  In more recent times, scientists 
have argued for and agreed upon an expansion in the scope of the 
Montreal Protocol in 2016 in order to dramatically reduce the 
effects of climate change.48  However, this expansion may prove to 
be less successful when compared to the rapid and unquestionable 
efficacy of the original agreement.  When considering the overall 
design of a hypothetical security agreement to safeguard dams, the 
inclusion of additional or unrelated dangerous structures might be 
met with contention by international policy makers who fear that 
expanding the scope might detract from its original objective. 
Furthermore, as argued by Leslie Johns in Depth Versus Rigidity 
in the Design of International Trade Agreements, “depth and rigidity 
affect the stability of the cooperative regime  the ability of the regime 
to endure.”49  Despite referring to international trade agreements, this 
statement is analogous when applied to other types of international 
agreements.  International financial accords, including specific G20 
 
 46. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 42. 
 47. Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, What Makes International Agreements Work: 
Defining Factors for Success 3, 12 (Center for International Cooperation 2012), https:// 
www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7839.pdf. 
 48. G. Velders, A. Ravishankara, M. Miller, M. Molina, J. Alcamo, J. Daniel, D. Fahey, 
S. Montzka, S. Reimann, Preserving Montreal Protocol Climate Benefits by Limiting HFCs, 
SCIENCE VOL. 335 (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.igsd.org/documents/Science-2012-Velders-
922-3.pdf.  
 49. Leslie Johns, Depth Versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements, 
Vol. 26 (3) J. THEO. POL. 468, 469, (2014), http://www.lesliejohns.me/DvR .pdf. 
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decisions during times of financial crisis, have largely been successful 
because of their narrow focus and deep obligations; whereas certain 
human rights treaties crafted by the United Nations have been seen as 
shallow and problematic.50  American law professor Eric Posner has 
argued that agreements such as the Convention Against Torture have 
banned the practice of torture on paper but that “Governments in some 
150 countries (out of about 193 U.N. members) use torture, not much 
different from when the treaty went into force in 1987.”51  Similar 
claims may be made concerning the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women.52  If one were to consider the 
design and scope of a hypothetical security resolution on safeguarding 
dangerous dams from non-state actors, Resolution 1540 would serve 
as an excellent model.  As demonstrated, the resolution was crafted in 
a manner that avoids the ineffectiveness seen in other frameworks.  It 
also mirrors the narrow focus and depth of accords that have proven 




Daniel Bodansky in his work Legally Binding Versus Non-
Legally Binding Instruments, indicates how “formulating an 
agreement in legally binding terms signals stronger commitment . . . 
and it can serve as a stronger basis for domestic and international 
mobilization.”53  Accordingly, the binding nature of Resolution 1540 
is an essential component to the resolutions’ success, and reinforces 
its role as a model international agreement for a hypothetical collective 
security resolution on dams.  Resolution 1540 was adopted by the 
United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter.  In adopting the resolution in this manner, it imposes 
binding obligations on all member states,54 requiring them to take a 
number of steps in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
 
 50. Emily O’Brien & Richard Gowan, supra note 47. 
 51. Kenneth Roth & Eric Posner, Dec. 28, 2014, Have Human Rights Treaties Failed?, 
N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 28, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/28/have-hu 
man-rights-treaties-failed. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Daniel Bodanksy, Legally Binding Versus Non-legally Binding Instruments in 
TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME 155, 15556 (Scott Barrett, Carlo 
Carraro, & Jaime de Melo eds., 2015). 
 54. U.N. Charter art. 103. 
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destruction.55  For instance, OP1 of the resolution dictates that states 
“shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors 
that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, 
transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their 
means of delivery.”56  OP2 then articulate how states must adopt 
national legislation to prohibit the aforementioned regulations, and 
OP3 requires the enforcement of domestic controls, like border 
control, to prevent proliferation.57  
These binding commitments were crafted as a means of fostering 
legitimate international cooperation, but not all binding agreements 
bring about serious collaboration.  The Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol was created for developed nations 
to satisfy their binding national emissions targets.58  In spite of these 
binding commitments for developed nations, developing countries 
were not included in establishing binding commitments, contributing 
to the ineffectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.59  This suggests that the 
binding nature of Resolution 1540 is not necessarily exemplary.  
Instead, it is the universality of the resolutions’ binding nature that 
establishes it as a model for a hypothetical security agreement.   
In addition, Resolution 1540 does not indicate how states should 
go about meeting the obligations of the resolution, but instead only 
addresses what the states are required to do.60  It is common to think 
of binding agreements as precise in nature with clearly indicated 
means for satisfying enumerated obligations.  Yet, legal instruments 
like Resolution 1540 can be binding and still provide states flexibility 
in achieving goals, whereas nonbinding accords can be extremely 
precise in how a state should satisfy obligations.61  This component of 
the resolution is particularly important for a hypothetical resolution on 
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dam security as it attempts to offsets sovereignty concerns.  It manages 
to do so while simultaneously requiring sovereign states to change 
their behavior through the enactment of specific domestic 
legislation.62  This is evidenced by Laos, who despite voicing some 
concerns over sovereignty, still supported the resolution.63  
Furthermore, countries like the United States decided to cosponsor the 
resolution.64  One might find this especially odd since the United 
States has refused to ratify a number of treaties over sovereignty 
concerns.65  For example, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court was signed by the United States in 2000.  However, 
the United States would later write to the U.N. Secretary in 2002 
indicating that they did not want to become a party to the treaty, and 
consequently relinquished themselves of any legal obligations.66  
Fortunately for the international community, state actors have 
historically been known to cooperate in order to confront problems 
that would typically require a joint effort.67 The international security 
threat presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
by nonstate actors is certainly a threat requiring joint effort and 
binding obligations.  Along the same lines, dam sabotage by non-state 
actors requires cooperation and specific obligations since the 
consequences of such sabotage have global ramifications.  
Consequently, the universal binding nature of Resolution 1540 
supports its role as an exemplary model for the proposed hypothetical 
security resolution.   
 
Role in Existing Legal Regime  
 
As argued by Emily O’Brien and Richard Gowan in What Makes 
International Agreements Work: Defining Factors for Success, a 
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successful international agreement should “fit well with existing 
international regimes and institutions.”  Resolution 1540 is an ideal 
model for a hypothetical security resolution to safeguard large dams 
from sabotage by nonstate actors because it satisfies these terms, 
especially with regard to its role in the existing nonproliferation 
regime.  Resolution 1540 reinforces existing international law, as 
opposed to replacing it.  The resolution compliments treaties such as 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
Chemical Weapons Convention, as these were deemed to be integral 
components to the preexisting nonproliferation regime.68  Resolution 
1540 not only compliments the existing regime, but also explicitly 
states that it does not alter or conflict with obligations specified in 
others treaties in the regime.69  The previously existing 
nonproliferation regime could be described as one with glaring holes 
that did not sufficiently address the evolving fundamental threats to 
proliferation, including the acquisition and utilization of weapons of 
mass destruction by terrorist organizations.70  One can draw direct 
parallels between the problems of the earlier nonproliferation regime 
and the inadequacies of codified customary international law in 
preventing dam sabotage by nonstate actors.  In fact, a hypothetical 
security resolution on dam security could even fit within the existing 
nonproliferation regime, as it would represent a simple expansion, but 
not drastic modification of the regime.  Adding dam sabotage as a 
means of delivering a weapon of mass destruction under the 
definitions specified in Resolution 1540 would allow the hypothetical 
agreement to easily fit within the resolution.  The hypothetical 
resolution could also be a stand-alone agreement within the existing 
regime.   
The U.N. Security Council, an existing institution composed of 
the most powerful nations in the world, crafted resolution 1540.71  The 
forum and institution that is chosen for negotiations plays an integral 
role in shaping the rules of international agreements.72  If the proposed 
agreement on dam security were to be adopted by this existing 
institution and legal regime, the institutional imprimatur behind the 
resolution might convince non-state actors like ISIS to finally obey the 
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law.  Nonstate actors would find it increasingly more difficult to 
transgress international law through dam sabotage if every nation was 
required to implement certain domestic protections for these 
structures.  In addition, taking action that directly flies in the face of 
the U.N. Security Council might disincentivize dangerous non-state 
actors because unlike the UN Security Council, unlike the Red Cross, 
has the means to punish transgressors.  The U.N. Security Council 
approved military action against Libya in 2011 through Resolution 
1973, where a limited military response by the United States, France, 
and Great Britain brought about the end of the Qaddafi regime within 
a matter of months.73  It can be presumed that a cooperative military 
response from the council would minimally require nonstate actors to 





Another reason that Resolution 1540 is an ideal international 
agreement on which to base a hypothetical security resolution is 
because its adoption was a reflection of legitimate political buy-in.  
What Makes International Agreements Work highlights this issue by 
noting that the success of an international agreement requires 
legitimate political buy-in with a high degree of consent early on in 
the process.74  In other words, successful international agreements 
require parties to an agreement to see the benefit in their involvement 
or sacrifice during the initial stage of negotiations.  Political buy-in 
and consent could be effectively determined by evaluating whether the 
agreement reflects political trends that already exist within key 
states.75  Resolution 1540 was adopted during a time when world 
powers discovered that terrorist organizations were actively pursuing 
nuclear proliferation, and decided to take swift action to combat the 
threat on a global scale with binding requirements.76  The United 
States took an aggressive role in sponsoring and advocating for the 
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adoption of Resolution 1540,77 and the administration under George 
W. Bush may be directly credited with creating the necessary political 
buy-in to pass the resolution, evidenced by a unanimous adoption.78  
Likewise, our hypothetical security agreement also reflects preexisting 
trends because the United States has been actively engaged in 
assessing risks from the Mosul Dam for nearly a decade.79  What is 
more, the Italian government has also taken an active role by sending 
soldiers and engineers to protect the Mosul Dam in 2016.80  Continued 
American and Italian involvement demonstrates a distinct and ongoing 
trend by world powers in providing dam security to the developing 
world.  Given this trend, Resolution 1540 serves as an exemplary 
model for our hypothetical resolution on dams because it demonstrates 
that a similar resolution could be adopted with adequate initiative and 
sponsorship by a U.N. Security Council member.   
Political buy-in might be assumed for developed countries, like 
the United States, who unilaterally develop security plans to combat 
terrorism within their own borders in conjunction to mitigating 
security threats in developing nations.81  An international agreement 
that effectively prevents nonstate actors from sabotaging large dams 
might actually alleviate the amount of resources spent by the United 
States on protecting large dams worldwide.  This would create a 
significant amount of political buy-in because the expenses and 
resources spent on protection could instead be shared by a host of other 
nations.  In a comprehensive international framework, developing 
countries could build their own capacity to combat dam sabotage from 
nonstate actors with the help of various developed countries.  These 
nations might hesitate because of sovereignty concerns and the 
perception that this amounts to international meddling with their 
development.  However, these reservations could be offset by the 
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developed world simply paying for security or even providing security 
upon agreement by specific countries, thus safeguarding developing 
nations’ development.  Common but differentiated responsibilities is 
a prevalent principle of international law and is featured in a number 
of modern international agreements.  For instance, Article 4 of the 
Paris Accords states “ . . . Party’s then current nationally determined 
contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, 
in the light of different national circumstances.”82  One could argue 
that recognizing the varying capabilities of parties and adjusting 
responsibilities accordingly would produce a significant level of 
political buy-in.   
On the other hand, properly assessing interest and consent might 
prove to be more difficult in today’s international arena.  This is 
especially true when considering how an issue could be shared by 
nearly every nation, but not result in political buy-in and consent due 
to competing agendas like preexisting rivalries and misperceived 
national interests.83  The ongoing rift between the United States and 
Russian Federation perfectly illustrates this notion.  During a press 
conference in December 2016, President Vladimir Putin when 
referring to the United States noted, “We have a joint responsibility 
for the provision of international security and stability, for the 
strengthening of anti-proliferation regimes.”84  Be that as it may, 
disagreements over Ukraine and Syria have defined Russian-
American relations for a number of years.85  The preexisting rivalry 
between these two Security Council members might undermine even 
the best-laid efforts in creating legitimate political buyin for a 
hypothetical security resolution.   
Yet, the mere existence of preexisting rivalries does not 
automatically subject an international agreement to failure.  The 
exemplary nature of Resolution 1540 is partly due to its ability to 
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overcome existing antagonism.  Both France and the United States 
sponsored the final version of Resolution 1540,86 albeit French support 
for the resolution came at a time of hostility between the two nations 
regarding the American invasion of Iraq.87  Still, the intertwining goals 
and interests of France, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Russia, and China enabled the adoption of Resolution 1540.  These 
nations recognized how they would all mutually benefit from the 
agreement as each of them faced the threat of nuclear proliferation by 
terrorist organizations.  In crafting an international agreement to 
safeguard dams, each veto-wielding member of the council should be 
able to recognize that the benefits of 1540 are analogous to the 
hypothetical agreement.  Dam sabotage can happen anywhere, but the 
interconnected nature of our global economy ensures that a 
catastrophic event in one nation would send shockwaves around the 
world.  President Jimmy Carter in his lecture Negotiation: An 
Alternative to Hostility, dissects the issue of establishing political buy-
in with preexisting rivalries.  In discussing Soviet-American 
negotiations, he states “it was desirable to create an umbrella or 
general framework . . . so that both sides would believe it possible to 
reach their goals and not lose face.”88  Through this quote, one can 
understand that political buy-in and early consent in international 
agreements might be accomplished by proposing a framework that 
allows all parties involved to see the agreement as a means to achieve 
their goals.  Resolution 1540 certainly fostered this sentiment, 
solidifying its role as an exemplary model for a hypothetical resolution 




In discussing the implementation of Resolution 1540, it is helpful 
to first define the concept of implementation itself.  As identified by 
Kal Raustiala in Compliance & Effectiveness in International 
Regulatory Cooperation, implementation can be understood as “the 
process of putting international commitments into practice: the 
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passage of domestic legislation, promulgation of regulations, creation 
of institutions, and enforcement of rules.89  A special committee has 
overseen the implementation of Resolution 1540, including the 
adoption of domestic laws and establishment of domestic controls.  It 
is referred to as the 1540 Committee, a subsidiary body of the United 
Nations Security Council, which is comprised of various security and 
legal experts.90  It was established under Resolution 1540 and later 
expanded under Resolution 1977.  In 2011, Resolution 1977 was 
adopted by the United Nations Security Council to foster the proper 
implementation of Resolution 1540 and extend its mandate.91  
Numerous strategies exist for international agreements to ensure 
proper implementation,92 but Resolution 1540 and 1977 deal with 
implementation through an assistance based approach.93  As opposed 
to adopting a deterrence-based strategy, the Security Council 
recognized that implementation would be more difficult in certain 
states and created a means for states to ask for assistance.94  The 
committee works to connect states who ask for assistance with 
available sources of assistance: more capable states, international 
organizations, and regional organizations.95  The 1977 Resolution 
undoubtedly provides an important function for nonstate actors.  It 
should be noted that international organizations, NGOs, businesses, 
and civil society have recently taken a larger role in monitoring proper 
implementation of international agreements.96  
The assistance based strategy to implementation is especially 
important for a hypothetical security agreement on dangerous dams 
because developing nations such as Iraq are unfortunately incapable 
of ensuring their own security.  As illustrated by the Mosul Dam 
incident, an implementation strategy that emphasizes assistance will 
be best suited for the proposed collective security resolution since it 
would give developing nations a means of seeking support from more 
powerful actors in the developed world.  Only then would these 
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nations be able to safeguard dams from sabotage by nonstate actors.  
In North America alone, countries such as the Bahamas, Belize, and 
Guatemala have asked for assistance in effectively implementing 
Resolution 1540, whereas Canada and the United States have extended 
their support.97  One would assume a similar level of cooperation and 
assistance could emerge in the implementation of the hypothetical 
security resolution.  Establishing common but differentiated 
responsibilities in this new framework could incentivize nations of 
varying development paths, constitutional frameworks, and 
capabilities to work together towards a common objective of 
preventing dam sabotage by nonstate actors.   
Critics have voiced concerns that the likelihood of proper 
implementation of Resolution 1540 is precarious due to scale, 
resource, and commitment.98  It is undeniable that Resolution 1540 is 
difficult to implement, but these challenges have been openly 
acknowledged.  Resolution 1977 recognizes the task of long term 
implementation and outlines specific assistance mechanisms to bring 
about proper implementation.99  Furthermore, efforts to improve 
implementation are not limited to the 1977 Resolution.  During a 2007 
committee debate, Japan’s representative expressed a need for donor 
states to step in and provide individualized assistance based on the 
varying needs of recipients.100  Revisiting the implementation of an 
international agreement to ensure proper implementation should not 
be regarded as a sign of failure, but instead as a responsible means of 
acknowledging limitations and pragmatically searching for solutions.  
In addition, the criticism of inadequate implementation might be 
overstated.  During the first two years of implementation, only 32 
members of the United Nations formally asked for assistance in 
implementing the resolution, and just 24 of these 32 made specific 
requests.101  If one is to consider that this number of states only 
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represents a small minority of parties subject to Resolution 1540, 
critique of the resolutions incomplete implementation appears 
overblown.   
Regardless of this disproportional negative commentary, 
addressing concerns of inadequate implementation has actually 
reinforced the assertion that Resolution 1540 proves to be an 
exemplary model for an international security agreement.  One risk 
associated with international cooperation is anticipating the future 
behavior of treaty parties.102  Flexibility tools and adaptability have 
been argued to play a significant role in the success or failure of 
international agreements.103  This is especially true of implementation 
plans, which may need to be adjusted as a result of changed 
circumstances or unanticipated problems.  A hypothetical collective 
security agreement designed to safeguard dams from sabotage by non-
state actors would inherently require a long-term implementation 
strategy as seen in Resolution 1540.  The varying responsibilities and 
means of implementing the resolution would face similar issues of 
scale and resources.  Accordingly, even criticism of Resolution 1540 
supports its role as a model for emulation.  
  
 
Compliance Scheme  
 
Compliance in the international arena generally refers to 
whether an actor adheres to the specific rules outlined in an 
international agreement.”104  Yet, the ability to properly monitor 
compliance is largely dependent upon how clearly party obligations 
are specified within the framework.105  The universal and binding 
nature of Resolution 1540 might lead one to conclude that 
measuring compliance with this nonproliferation agreement would 
be a simple task; regrettably, this is not the case.  As previously 
indicated, the mandatory nature of Resolution 1540 only indicates 
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what parties must do, but is vague with regard to how they must go 
about accomplishing their obligations.106  This creates problems in 
properly evaluating and maintaining compliance.  If proper 
implementation hypothetically takes place, a party could easily fall 
out of compliance if competing national interests within a member 
state results in the repeal or modification of required domestic 
legislation.107  One would also need to consider how different 
national constitutions treat treaty ratification and withdrawal.  
Similarly, a country could implement required domestic controls, 
as stipulated in OP 3 of the resolution, but fall out of compliance 
because they are not able to effectively control their border.  A 
number of parties to Resolution 1540, including Greece, have been 
unable to adequately protect their borders against the ongoing 
European migrant crisis.108  One can infer that this would be more 
problematic in a developing nation with less resources at its 
disposal.  While stronger enforcement mechanisms could have been 
added to Resolution 1540 to rectify issues of noncompliance, these 
mechanisms have been proven to sometimes result in shallow 
agreements and limit participation in the agreements themselves.109  
Despite these challenges, compliance to Resolution 1540 can still 
be viewed as a widely observed phenomenon.  As of 2014, over 90 
percent of United Nations member states have submitted their 
mandated national compliance reports; these reports indicate what 
member states have done or are working on to comply with their 
obligations.110  The importance of these reports to the success of the 
resolutions compliance scheme should not be underestimated.  As 
demonstrated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, a number of international agreements place obligations on 
states that already comply with terms of the agreement.111  Here, 
countries are actually complying with the agreement by changing their 
behavior or enacting plans to change their behavior.  Adopting the 
resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter appears to 
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have brought about a surprisingly level of compliance without a direct 
reference to sanctions in the actual resolution.  Moreover, according 
to Igor Khripunov’s A Work in Progress: UN Security Resolution 1540 
After 10 Years, “No institution tasked with addressing an item atop the 
global agenda can reach maturity after 10 years.”112  This quote adds 
needed perspective to Resolution 1540, and enables one to 
contextualize how its current level of compliance is actually 
exemplary.  A collective security resolution aimed at safeguarding 
dams against sabotage by nonstate actors would face similar obstacles 
to compliance.  Nevertheless, the hypothetical agreement would still 
be considered a success if compliance were to be observed on the same 
level as with Resolution 1540.  The compliance scheme of Resolution 




The overall objective of this paper is to identify how a 
comprehensive international framework could be constructed to 
safeguard dangerous dams against sabotage by nonstate actors.  To 
accomplish this goal, the necessity of an international agreement to 
manage this security risk needed to be substantiated.  This was 
demonstrated through an assay of the magnitude of devastation which 
can arise from dam failure, the inadequacies of international law, and 
the growing threat of dam sabotage in the developing world.  Although 
there is no international framework currently in place to address dam 
security, upon examination, one can deduce that the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1540 serves as a quintessential model for 
such a resolution.  This assertion has been conveyed through an 
analysis of the resolutions background, design, binding nature, role in 
existing legal regime, political buy-in, implementation, and 
compliance scheme.  Moreover, a dissection of the perceived 
limitations and criticisms of Resolution 1540, especially with regard 
to its implementation and compliance scheme, actually lends support 
to the resolution’s exemplary nature.   
There are certain aspects of this argument that need to be further 
explored.  Future research needs to provide a more detailed figure on 
the specific dams to be covered under a hypothetical agreement.  As 
seen in the United States, dam safety agencies classify dams according 
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to the potential consequences of dam failure in areas located 
downstream of the structure.113  The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) stipulates that hazard potential should be based on 
the worse-case scenario and factor in the possibility of human 
causalities.114  It would need to be determined whether similar 
guidelines or other national policies could be applied to an 
international agreement.  It would also be helpful to distinguish 
whether other types of installations containing dangerous forces, such 
as dykes or nuclear reactors, could be included in the same agreement.  
Despite the need for further clarification, this paper serves a 
fundamental purpose in establishing the necessity for an international 
security agreement to manage a specific security risk, and then 
exploring how the agreement might be modeled.  Hopefully, world 
powers prioritize this distinct security threat and take swift action in 
crafting an international agreement.  Only a comprehensive 
international solution can truly ensure that dangerous dams are not 
sabotaged by hostile non-state actors. 
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